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Introduction 
The concept of altering human conscious experience and behaviour via unauthorised manipulation 
of implanted electronic devices dates back to science fiction literature of the 1980s, when authors 
began to speculate about the advantages and pitfalls offered by hypothetical electronic neural 
implants
1,2
. Until recently the risk of neurological implants being used against their users was firmly 
in the realm of fantasy. However, the increasing sophistication of invasive neuromodulation, coupled 
with developments in information security research and consumer electronics, has resulted in a 
small but real risk of malicious individuals accessing implantable pulse generators (IPGs). 
Unauthorised access to IPGs could cause serious harm to the patients in whom the devices are 
implanted. 
This review summarizes the current literature on the plausibility and potential impact of this risk, 
identifies possible physiological mechanisms of attack, and highlights trade-offs inherent in IPG 
design that provide exploitable vulnerabilities. In doing so we aim to raise awareness of neurological 
implant security and thereby stimulate discussion of defensive measures. Other than a very brief 
review from 2009
3
, this article is the first to address medical implant information security threats in 
detail from a neurological/neurosurgical perspective. 
For the purposes of this review, unauthorised control of an electronic brain implant will be referred 
to as “brainjacking”, analogous to the hijacking of a vehicle. The term “neurosecurity” is used to 
refer to defence mechanisms protecting neurological implants from subversion
3
. 
Plausibility and risk of brainjacking 
Over 100,000 patients worldwide have received deep brain stimulation (DBS), predominantly for 
movement disorders
4
. This number is only likely to increase in the future as DBS shows promise for 
treating a wide range of neurological and psychiatric conditions
5,6
. More speculatively, DBS and 
similar implants have been proposed as a potential tool for enhancing cognition in healthy
individuals
7–9
and as a method of correcting “abnormal moral behaviour”
10
. Factors contributing to
the increasing prevalence of DBS include reductions in treatment cost, increasing demand in newly
industrialised countries, ageing populations in more economically developed countries, and ongoing
improvements in IPG design
11
.
ACCEPTED MANUSCR
With increasingly widespread adoption of these intracranial neuromodulation techniques comes 
greater opportunity for individuals with a high degree of technical competence to use the 
technology for malicious purposes. Information technology security researchers have demonstrated 
the potential for exploitation of the security limitations of implantable medical devices, with 
potentially severe consequences. 
To date, two implantable medical devices have been exploited publicly – insulin pumps and 
implantable cardiac defibrillators. In 2011, Jay Radcliffe, a security researcher and diabetic, utilised 
publicly available device information and an inexpensive consumer-grade microprocessor with 
radiofrequency transmitter to bypass the security of an insulin pump, and outlined a potentially 
lethal method of attack
12
. This work was extended by Barnaby Jack, who demonstrated unauthorised 
control over an insulin pump at a distance of 90 metres without prior knowledge of the device serial 
number, a limitation of Radcliffe’s earlier attack
13
. Jack further demonstrated unauthorised and 
potentially lethal control over an implantable defibrillator 
14
, a risk first outlined in 2008 by academic 
research
15
. As a result of this work, the FDA has issued a safety warning over the risks of inadequate 
medical device security
16
 and public workshops have been undertaken in collaboration with industry 
to address the issue
17,18
. Most recently, the FDA has warned about intrusion vulnerabilities in a 
continuous external drug pump
19
. Furthermore, the United States Department of Homeland Security 
has issued an alert regarding the unacceptable risks associated with using hard-coded 
(unchangeable) passwords in medical devices
20
. 
Unauthorised access to implants can be lethal – deliberate misuse of an insulin pump (albeit not via 
electronic exploitation) has been reported in at least one murder
21
 and US Vice President Dick 
Cheney reportedly had the wireless telemetry on his ICD disabled during his time in office for fear of 
political assassination
22
. Wireless exploitation of implants is also likely to be subtle – device failures 
are a somewhat common eventuality 
23
 and post-failure device diagnostics are rarely performed. 
Even if an attack were detected, tracking down the attacker would be a highly challenging task.  
Attacks could be made for a variety of reasons including blackmail, malice against an individual, or 
manipulation of a politically notable individual. The motive need not even be rational; in 2008 a 
website for epilepsy sufferers was attacked using flashing images designed to trigger seizures
24
, with 
the attackers’ apparent motivation being amusement.  
Similar security issues have been raised in the automobile industry, particularly in the wake of high-
profile proof-of-concept hacks of several major vehicle brands
25
. The security research community 
has released a set of guidelines, the “Five Star Automotive Cyber Safety Program”
26
, the principles of 
which may be translatable to neurosecurity design. 
The information technology community has given some degree of recognition to medical implant 
information security vulnerabilities, as detailed in Secure implant design, but the topic has only been 
discussed seriously in the biomedical literature recently
27–29
 and there are no detailed discussions of 
the risks specific to neurological implants beyond a single forward-thinking but brief review 
published several years ago
3
. 
Methods of attack 
Once an attacker has successfully breached security on a device, they have several options for brain-
jacking their victim. Stimulation parameters including voltage/current, frequency, pulse width, and 
electrode contact can be altered in order to change the effect of stimulation
30
. These potential 
attacks are unlikely to be directly lethal, but may cause serious harm and distress. The list below is 
not exhaustive and, as the variety and complexity of invasive neuromodulation therapies increases, 
the potential methods of attack grow in number. Several of these attack strategies are highly 
speculative and could require a degree of physical or informational access that is unrealistic for most 
attackers. Clinicians should nevertheless be aware of these possibilities, especially as the complexity 
of neural implants increases, with a concomitant increase in the complexity and variety of available 
attack vectors. See Table 1 for an overview of potential attacks. 
Blind attacks 
The most straightforward attacks rely on no patient-specific knowledge on the part of the attacker, 
i.e. the attacker is “blind”. Simply turning off the stimulation would result in a loss of therapeutic
effect. If temporary, this would typically be no more than an annoyance as the patient would be able 
to re-initiate stimulation, although sudden cessation of stimulation can cause serious “rebound” 
symptoms in a variety of disorders including Parkinson’s disease (PD), essential tremor (ET), and 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD)
31–34
. More invasive attacks would allow permanent disabling of 
an IPG, necessitating surgical replacement of the device, with concomitant surgical risks and 
expenses. 
Repeated interrogation of an implanted device can deplete the battery prematurely
35
. In the case of 
traditional non-rechargeable IPGs, this will result in reduced device lifespan; in the case of 
rechargeable models, repeated over-draining of the battery can result in the device disabling itself in 
order to avoid potential catastrophic failure (depending on IPG model). Battery damage would also 
necessitate IPG replacement. 
Although the above forms of brainjacking would be unpleasant, their lasting effects would likely be 
minor. It would, however, be possible to induce tissue damage as a result of increasing pulse width 
and voltage. The firmware of most IPGs is designed to lock out dangerous stimulation parameters 
under normal usage, but an attacker may be able to subvert these limits. Typical parameters for DBS 
induce minimal tissue damage
36–38
 but feline in vivo data indicate that tissue damage can occur at 
high charge densities
39,40
, with extrapolation from these data providing an estimate of safe 
stimulation parameters
41
. The effects of such electrically induced lesions would vary depending on 
location and extent of damage, but could result in serious disability. 
Finally, an attacker could seek to gain information from the target’s implant in a passive or active 
manner
27
, i.e. by passively “listening” for information transmitted during normal operation or 
actively accessing the device to receive information. Most IPGs store some identifiable information 
including patient name, diagnosis, and physician details; all IPGs, by necessity, store information 
regarding stimulation parameters. Acquiring this information may be an ends in itself or may form 
the first stage of one of the targeted attack strategies detailed below. 
Targeted attacks 
More elaborate attacks could make use of implanted electrodes to alter behaviour and cognition by 
modifying stimulation parameters based on some degree of pathophysiological knowledge of the 
patient. Increasing or decreasing stimulation frequency has a substantial impact on the efficacy of 
DBS for several indications, in some cases reversing the positive effects of stimulation. Alteration of 
voltage or pulse width changes the volume of tissue activated (VTA)
30,42
, which may diminish the 
treatment effect or induce unpleasant off-target effects by stimulating surrounding structures. 
Changing the electrode contact(s) used for stimulation would enable off-target structures to be 
stimulated directly, resulting in variable effects depending on electrode location and surgical 
approach used
43
. With the development of directionally selective electrodes, currently being 
introduced into clinical use
44
, the intended increase in precision of on-target stimulation could also 
afford attackers more sophisticated control over malicious off-target stimulation. 
These attacks may require sophisticated knowledge of the patient’s clinical condition, making them 
more challenging to perform, although the effects are potentially more desirable from some 
attackers’ perspective. A dedicated attacker may be able to acquire medical records via breaching 
medical databases, social engineering, or simple attacks as discussed above. Even without medical 
knowledge of the patient, scanning up and down stimulation parameters could enable an attacker to 
empirically determine settings that cause distress. 
Impairing motor function 
Movement disorders are the most common indications for DBS, with over 100,000 patients 
estimated to have undergone DBS for PD alone
4
. In both PD and ET there is potential for an attacker 
to subvert IPG function to impair motor control. In patients receiving DBS of the subthalamic nucleus 
(STN) for PD, stimulation at a frequency of ≥130 Hz typically results in desired clinical outcomes
45
, 
whereas 5-10 Hz or ~20 Hz stimulation can significantly exacerbate bradykinetic/akinetic 
symptoms
46–49
. Similar effects have been reported in DBS of the internal globus pallidus for PD, 
wherein switching to more dorsal electrode contacts resulted in pronounced akinesia
50
. Given these 
data, an attacker may substantially impair motor function by altering basic stimulation parameters, 
thereby increasing the patient’s parkinsonian symptoms beyond baseline levels. A similar potential 
attack exists for ET patients with DBS of the ventral intermediate nucleus, wherein low frequency, 
high voltage stimulation can significantly exacerbate tremor symptoms
51
. 
Inducing pain 
DBS is an effective treatment for a wide range of chronic pain disorders, with most established 
techniques showing efficacy for focal pain
52
, and emerging targets showing promise in the treatment 
of whole-body pain syndromes
53,54
. The periventricular/periaqueductal grey matter (PVG/PAG) and 
the ventral-posterolateral/ventral-posteromedial nuclei of the sensory thalamus (VPL/VPM) are the 
most frequently targeted regions. In clinical practice, these nuclei are stimulated at low frequency to 
alleviate pain, but higher frequency stimulation, above ~70 Hz, is reported to increase painful 
sensations
54,55
. Alteration of stimulation frequency in this manner by an attacker could induce severe 
pain in these patients. 
Altering impulse control 
Impulse control disorders (ICDs), involving behavioural problems such as hypersexuality and 
pathological gambling, are a relatively common problem in patients with PD and are particularly 
strongly associated with the use of dopaminergic agonists
56,57
. In normal clinical practice, STN-DBS 
offers a mechanism for reduction of dopaminergic medication, thereby assisting in the management 
of ICDs
58,59
.  
Several case reports indicate that inappropriate electrode contact selection can induce a range of 
disturbances in impulse control. Mania, hypersexuality, and pathological gambling have been linked 
with specific electrode contacts
60–63
. The precise effects of a given contact will depend on a variety of 
factors – individual anatomical variation, surgical approach taken, other stimulation parameters, etc. 
– but it appears plausible that disruption of impulse control could be achieved in at least a subset of
patients via switching of electrode contact. An attacker may be able to disrupt the clinician-set 
stimulation parameters and thereby remove protection from, or even induce, ICDs. 
Modifying emotion and affect 
Alteration of emotional processing and affect can occur during DBS, either as a side-effect or as part 
of the intended stimulation effects. Dysfunction of emotional behaviour has been noted in several 
case reports of patients receiving STN-DBS for PD, including pathological crying
64–66
, inappropriate 
laughter
67
, and affective lability
68
; likely due to off-target stimulation. Undesirable off-target 
emotional effects have also been observed in patients receiving DBS of the nucleus accumbens 
(NAcc) for OCD, notably strong sensations of fear and panic with concomitant autonomic arousal
69–
71
. Deliberate stimulation of inappropriate electrode contacts by an attacker may, therefore, induce 
personally and socially undesirable emotional changes, which would likely be highly distressing for a 
patient and their loved ones. 
Modulating reward processing 
Perhaps the most concerning attack strategy feasible using currently implanted neural devices 
involves the use of operant conditioning to exert substantial control over a patient’s behaviour. As 
noted above, the NAcc is the target of stimulation in several emerging DBS indications, including 
depression, OCD, and anorexia. Currently the number of patients undergoing NAcc-DBS is small 
although this number may rise if one or more indications proves to be clinically viable. 
The enhancement/attenuation of positive reinforcement effected by NAcc stimulation has been well 
demonstrated in humans and other animals
72,73
 and, indeed, is a core component of the rationale for 
its value as a target in such a broad range of conditions
74–76
. Sufficient control over the IPG could 
enable use of operant conditioning to modify the behaviour of the victim, potentially reinforcing 
harmful behaviours. This strategy would require an even greater level of sophistication on the part 
of the attacker than required by most of the attacks discussed above. One would need continuous 
control over the IPG for an extended period of time, along with a means of surveillance over the 
victim. It would be feasible for the attacker to use a wireless relay device placed near the victim to 
remove the need to be in close physical proximity, but placing this device without detection would 
bring its own challenges. 
Secure implant design 
Several design constraints exist that necessitate trade-offs between neurosecurity and other 
desirable features of IPGs. These trade-offs and challenges, along with specific methods of attack 
and desirable security features for future devices, have been discussed in greater detail elsewhere
27–
29,77–79
, therefore this section will consider the factors most relevant to clinical practice – battery life 
and practicality. 
Telemetric adjustment of IPG settings provides substantial benefits in terms of the flexibility and 
usability of the device
27
, but also provides mechanisms by which the device may be subverted. To 
date, IPG telemetry has relied on near-field transcutaneous wireless communication between the 
implanted device and proprietary IPG-specific external telemetry devices, using several dedicated 
frequency bands, under the control of either clinician or patient. The newest IPGs utilise consumer-
grade wireless communication protocols such as Bluetooth, and in the longer-term, device 
manufacturers are considering utilising communication over TCP/IP, enabling remote telemetric 
control and/or software updates of IPGs over the internet. Additionally, manufacturers are shifting 
from proprietary external hardware programmers (which are expensive to design, manufacture, and 
update) to proprietary software running on consumer devices such as tablets and smartphones. 
Unfortunately, both proprietary and consumer protocols have drawbacks; proprietary systems 
typically attempt to make use of “security through obscurity”, i.e. maintaining secrecy about 
software/hardware design in order to thwart potential attackers, which is unreliable
79
. Proprietary 
designs are also typically less open to security researchers due to manufacturers’ reluctance to 
disclose trade secrets to third parties, which increases the challenge of uncovering security flaws. 
This challenge is exacerbated by the risk of lawsuits brought against legitimate security researchers 
for disclosing design flaws under legislation such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, as 
discussed in a recent guidance statement made by the Electronic Frontier Foundation to the FDA
80
. 
Conversely, popular consumer protocols are widely adopted and understood, potentially lowering 
the barrier of entry to attackers. 
Emerging IPG technology will provide opportunities and pitfalls in terms of neurosecurity. One 
potential example is “closed-loop” or “adaptive” DBS, wherein physiological signals are used to alter 
stimulation profiles on the fly, without any intervention from patients or clinicians. These systems 
may plausibly be more resilient to brainjacking attempts, as the decreased requirements for human 
intervention would facilitate the use of less easily accessible programming methods than current IPG 
user interfaces, thereby increasing security without a concomitant decrease in system utility. 
Conversely, however, the increased complexity of closed-loop systems may provide additional 
surfaces for attackers to exploit. Certain experimental closed-loop systems utilise wireless interfaces 
between sensor, controller, and stimulation components
81,82
; use of such a design would effectively 
turn neuromodulation into a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. By 
maliciously influencing the such a system’s input, it is possible to influence output parameters and 
thereby alter stimulation – a process that has been demonstrated to devastating effect in several 
real-world SCADA systems, most famously the Iranian nuclear fuel centrifuges that were damaged by 
malware called Stuxnet
83
. 
Several potential security solutions exist although, as detailed below, many are subject to 
limitations. Specific solutions include improved auditing
84
, rolling code cryptography
77
, server-based 
cryptographic key management
28
, formal verification of device software
85
, proximity-based 
authentication
86,87
, and “communication cloaker” or “shield” wearable devices that mediate secure 
communication between programmer and implant
88,89
. For more detail, see Camara et al. (2015)
27
. 
It is the responsibility of IPG manufacturers to carefully trade-off between clinical demands, 
ergonomics, and neurosecurity. Designing any secure digital system is difficult and, as discussed 
below, IPG design presents several unusual challenges that are not easily solved without causing 
problems elsewhere in the system. Neuromodulation is a rapidly evolving field and it is difficult to 
predict future innovations, so any regulatory approach to solving problems of neurosecurity must 
carefully balance information security risks with the risk of impeding technological development 
through application of inflexible rules. Manufacturers and regulators should endeavour to ensure 
that, when security flaws are found, researchers are able to disclose these flaws in a safe and timely 
manner without undue legal impediments
80
.  
Battery life 
Most IPGs currently in use rely on a non-rechargeable battery, which can last anywhere from <1 year 
to a decade, depending on IPG model and stimulation parameters
90
, necessitating surgery to explant 
and replace the depleted device. Given the risks and distress associated with surgery, manufacturers 
attempt to maximise the life of the battery by using the highest-capacity cells that are feasible and 
by minimising power drain resulting from the electronic systems.  
A substantial portion of energy usage is taken up by the stimulation itself and is therefore 
unavoidable, but the rest is devoted to maintaining the function of the internal electronics of the 
device – microprocessor(s), memory, and wireless communication system. Most potential security 
improvements involve increased power drain from one or more of these components, or the 
inclusion of additional components that would contribute to energy usage. Cryptographic systems 
require extra processing power to encrypt/decrypt data
79
, improved auditing requires more memory 
to be of value, and frequent software verification would result in increased wireless 
communications. Rechargeable IPGs are becoming increasingly popular and reduce the importance 
of battery life somewhat, but the limited charge/discharge cycles available to each battery and the 
desire to maximise time between charging still necessitate a careful approach to power 
management. Future closed-loop DBS systems may reduce power consumption in comparison to 
traditional IPGs
91
, thereby freeing up more energy to be used for security systems. 
Practicality 
A crucial design consideration for any security system is the human factor. Human error is a major 
cause of security failures across many domains of information technology
92
 and ergonomics is an 
important secondary concern in the development of medical devices
93
. If a security system requires 
too much time and effort on the part of patients and clinicians, there is risk that it will remain 
unused or, potentially worse, that it will be improperly used and thereby provide a false sense of 
security. Furthermore, in a medical context, ease-of-use and open access can be critical for proper 
treatment. 
Most of the security solutions that would be implemented on the implantable device would not 
impact considerably upon the practicality of the system; a little extra time setting up proper security 
protocols during the initial programming stage is acceptable and, with adequate training, may be 
implemented reliably. Problems are more likely to arise with additional devices being added to the 
system, especially if patients are expected to use these devices constantly. Cloaker and shield 
devices have been proposed
88,89
 – external electronic devices that provide an additional layer of 
security between the implant and other devices that are trying to communicate with it. These would 
likely provide a substantial improvement to system security, but would risk being under-utilised due 
to the inconvenience of carrying around additional devices. Excessively burdensome security 
systems may even incentivise non-adherence to treatment, resulting in re-emergence of a patient’s 
symptoms. This inconvenience may be attenuated by integration of the security systems into 
consumer-grade electronic devices, e.g. by enabling a patient’s smartphone to act as a 
communications hub
78
, but using consumer devices in this manner raises yet more security 
concerns. 
Device manufacturers are beginning to offer telemetric control of neural implants using consumer 
devices; several IPGs currently on the market offer integration with smartphone or tablet type 
devices. This development may provide substantial benefits in terms of user friendliness and 
reduced clinical visits. However, enabling access to implants via internet-enabled consumer 
electronics risks attackers exploiting security flaws in these devices and thereby indirectly accessing 
and subverting implants. Remote network access vastly increases the availability of devices to 
attackers, making attacks easier and therefore more attractive. A 2015 FDA warning addressed 
security vulnerabilities in a network-accessible drug pump
19
, demonstrating the risks associated with 
internet-enabled medical devices. This issue of network security in healthcare is discussed in detail in 
a recent paper by Independent Security Evaluators 
94
 
Notably, allowing wireless access to implants in this manner would enable over-the-air firmware 
updates, which are not currently implemented in any model of IPG. This would facilitate the 
patching of security holes (increasingly important for the longer-lasting rechargeable IPGs), but 
would also leave devices open to injection of counterfeit firmware updates
95
. Firmware serves to 
control the hardware of embedded medical devices such as IPGs, so any alteration to it would 
enable substantial changes to the function of the device, beyond the changes that are possible 
through the user interface. For example, while the user interface on most IPGs will prevent the 
setting of stimulation parameters capable of causing tissue damage (as discussed in “Blind attacks”, 
above), alteration of firmware may be able to bypass these restrictions, enabling attackers to cause 
lesions. Allowing IPGs to connect to the internet routinely would increase the probability of such 
illegitimate firmware modification by allowing attackers to access the devices remotely instead of 
requiring them to be in close proximity. 
Manufacturers must carefully weigh these factors when deciding whether wireless interfacing is 
suitable for a given implantable device. An important consideration here is the context under which 
updates can take place and the authorisations necessary; it may be preferable to prevent updates 
being made over the internet and instead require an authorisation mechanism that is only available 
in a clinical setting. 
Another key concern is the accessibility of neural implants in case of emergency. Clinicians may be 
presented with an unconscious or otherwise non-communicative patient whose implant they must 
access to provide effective treatment, but are unable to do so due to security measures. Thus, the 
device must have an emergency mode, which leaves open a potential attack vector, meaning that 
designing such a mode is a technical challenge
27
. Similar considerations must be made with regards 
to patient programming modes – it is valuable for patients to be able to access their own implants 
and change stimulation parameters to some degree at home, but allowing too great a degree of 
control via patient programmers enables easy access for attackers or misuse by patients. 
Conclusions 
Use of implanted neuromodulation is still a relatively new field, but has already had a great impact 
on the treatment of several severe neurological disorders. The future of this field is highly promising 
and, contingent on positive outcomes in clinical trials and gradual reductions in hardware cost, it is 
probable that these devices will only become more popular. This popularity is also contingent on 
factors such as public acceptance and reliability of implanted neurostimulators, both of which could 
be substantially negatively impacted by failures in device security. 
It bears repeating that this neurosecurity threat is still likely theoretical. We were not able to identify 
any evidence that the scenarios detailed above have ever been attempted. Nevertheless, we believe 
that the issues discussed in this paper indicate that brainjacking is a potentially serious threat that 
warrants serious discussion before any real-world harms occur. As a result of the paucity of work 
specifically addressing brainjacking, there are several areas of investigation that may prove fruitful. 
First, as this review is merely a first step towards more rigorous discussion of neurosecurity issues, 
there are doubtless several as-yet unidentified potential attack strategies. The focus of the present 
paper has been on IPGs for DBS but epilepsy monitoring systems, sensory prosthetics, brain-
computer interfaces, and other emerging neurotechnologies are all likely to have device-specific 
opportunities and challenges worthy of study. Detailed threat modelling may prove to be useful in 
identification of the most effective strategies for minimising neurosecurity related risk. Stakeholders 
should collaborate to quantify the expected risk of brainjacking in order to facilitate development of 
mitigation strategies. 
Second, more resources should be put into development of novel mechanisms to enhance 
neurosecurity, along with appropriation of mechanisms utilised in other fields. It may be valuable to 
develop codes of best practice for neurosecurity, or to formulate overall guidelines for medical 
device security that can be tailored to the specific requirements of neural implants. Any such code 
should be formulated to encourage cooperation between stakeholders and be sufficiently flexible to 
adapt to the rapid pace of change in neurological implant design. Device manufacturers must strive 
to improve upon recent advances, ensuring that security concerns are considered throughout the 
design process and not relegated to an afterthought, and should cooperate with security researchers 
who seek to responsibly disclose design flaws. Regulatory bodies must balance use of their powers 
to encourage good neurosecurity practices with the risk of impairing real-world security through 
overly burdensome regulations. Given that neurosecurity is not an immediate concern, there is 
sufficient time for manufacturers and regulatory agencies to carefully consider methods of risk 
mitigation. While there is a responsibility for manufacturers to make their devices secure, the 
expected value of any novel security features should be carefully weighed against other clinically 
relevant factors, and innovation should not be unduly stifled by the demands of neurosecurity. 
Third, given the unique challenges presented by brainjacking, further research into its implications 
beyond purely biomedical considerations may be valuable. The philosophical implications of exerting 
control over another human being in this manner are potentially quite profound and deserving of 
detailed analysis. Similarly, the legal and economic implications may be substantial, especially if 
greatly increased proliferation of neurotechnology is to be expected. 
Finally, publicising these risks among clinicians and patients may be an important means of 
minimising risks. Even if it were possible to implement perfect security design, the human element 
of a system almost always presents a tempting target for attackers. Clinicians should educate 
themselves about the basics of information security and be mindful of the risks of brainjacking when 
evaluating faulty implants or caring for high-profile patients. Hospital staff should also be aware of 
social engineering techniques used by attackers to gain privileged information and should have at 
least a basic understanding of how to minimise neurosecurity risk. Patients should have some 
degree of awareness of particularly risky behaviours to avoid, although any discussion of this topic 
should avoid undue alarm and emphasise the extremely low probability of any individual patient 
being targeted by electronic attacks. 
In writing this paper, we are aware that the information contained herein could be used by an 
attacker to engage in one of the attacks described above. This is a risk we take seriously, but we 
believe that the benefits of publicising this topic outweigh the increased danger. The physiological 
mechanisms that we describe are all easily accessible in scientific journals and any intellectually 
capable attacker could do their own research; the main challenge for an attacker is in accessing the 
implanted devices, not in deciding what to do once access is achieved. Furthermore, as discussed 
above, the current risk of brainjacking is low. The examples given in this paper are intended to 
illustrate attacks that could be made even with our current, relatively crude, level of 
neurotechnology. It is better to consider this issue seriously now, rather than in a several years’ time 
when the sophistication of these implants is far greater, as would be the harm that an attacker may 
cause by subverting them. 
The advantages offered by integrating electronics with the human nervous system are substantial 
and the rapid development of this area suggests even greater things to come in the future. As with 
many emerging technologies, these advances are not without risks and pitfalls. The histories of both 
information security and medicine have amply demonstrated that prevention is better than cure, so 
let us apply these lessons to neurosecurity while the situation remains relatively tractable. 
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Table 1: Summary of attack types 
Attack category Attack type Condition Potential harms 
Blind 
Switching off IPG 
Any 
Denial of stimulation; rebound 
effects 
Draining battery 
Denial of stimulation; rebound 
effects; IPG damage 
Overcharge stimulation Tissue damage 
Data theft 
Violation of patient privacy; 
facilitation of further attacks 
Targeted 
~10Hz STN stimulation PD 
Hypokinesia/akinesia 
GPi electrode contact change PD 
Increase voltage/decrease 
frequency ViM stimulation 
ET Exacerbated tremor 
Increased frequency PAG/PVG 
stimulation 
Pain 
Increased pain 
Increased frequency VPL/VPM 
stimulation 
Pain 
STN electrode contact change PD 
Impulse control disoders; 
alteration of affect 
NAcc electrode contact change OCD Alteration of affect 
NAcc stimulation control 
OCD, 
depression 
Alteration of reward processing; 
operant conditioning 
Abbreviations: ET, essential tremor; GPi, internal globus pallidus; IPG, implantable pulse generator; NAcc, nucleus 
accumbens; OCD, obsessive-compulsive disorder; PAG/PVG, periaqueductal/periventricular grey matter; PD, Parkinson’s 
disease; STN, subthalamic nucleus; ViM, ventral intermediate thalamic nucleus; VPL/VPM, ventroposterior lateral/medial 
thalamic nucleus 
 
 
Abbreviation list 
DBS = Deep Brain Stimulation 
ET = Essential Tremor 
GPi = internal Globus Pallidus 
ICD = Impulse Control Disorder 
IPG = Implantable Pulse Generator 
NAcc = Nucleus Accumbens 
OCD = Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder 
PAG = Periaqueductal Grey matter 
PVG = Periventricular Grey matter 
PD = Parkinson’s Disease 
STN = Subthalamic Nucleus 
VPL = Ventroposterior Lateral thalamic nucleus 
VPM = Ventroposterior Medial thalamic nucleus 
VTA = Volume of Tissue Activated 
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